The Fall of Napoleon, 1813–14

WHEN 1812 ended, Alexander had determined to march from Russia towards the west in order to destroy Napoleon’s power over eastern Europe. The role of champion of the Christian world against its enslaver was great enough to fire the impressionable Tsar, while the chance of enormous conquests might well sway Catherine’s grandson. At the moment, however, a balanced calculation yielded dubious results. The Grand Army, indeed, had been destroyed, and with it those devoted Polish, German and Italian soldiers who, in their several countries, formed the main pillars of Napoleon’s power. But Napoleon still held the fortresses: the sovereigns were still nominally his allies: his Viceroy was assembling a considerable force at Posen: he himself was hurrying into existence a vast host which he like none other could inspire and use. The Russians, on the other hand, had shown little capacity in the field, and no new Suvorov had arisen. Ill-trained and ill-found, they must march through regions inhabited by their bitterest enemies, the Warsaw Poles. Alexander’s friends of 1812, moreover, were all confronted with a novel situation. Against Britain the United States had lately launched a war. She must send troops to Canada and meet a formidable series of attacks by sea. In the Peninsula her success had proved evanescent. With Napoleon and Joseph once again in Paris and Madrid, Wellington’s campaign of 1813 might be fought for nothing greater than the doorway into Portugal. The Spanish rebels, moreover, had proclaimed themselves upholders of everything most abhorrent to a Russian Tsar. Early in 1812, the extraordinary Cortes of Cadiz, while maintaining Catholicism, claimed sovereignty for the nation, limited the monarchy, confiscated the Church lands, freed the press and established a social and legal order in accordance with the Revolution. At that very time Alexander drove from office Speransky, the greatest of Russian ministers, who was tainted with similar ideas. On the Oder as on the Ebro, a crusade against Napoleon might involve alliance with the Revolution. There remained Sweden, which was secretly Russia’s ally, and the Turks, whose behaviour must influence Austria and Russia. Of the former it was hardly possible to be sure of more than that Bernadotte’s hopes of Norway would influence her course of action. To the Turks the Peace of Bucharest had given an opportunity to reduce Serbia to obedience and this they did. If Alexander were at death-grips with Napoleon, trouble might easily arise upon the Danube. Only the moderation shown at Bucharest prevented this from being almost certain. The Chances in 1813

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