Antitrust settlements under EC competition law
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
INTRODUCTION - CARTEL SETTLEMENTS AND COMMITMENT DECISIONS Mel Marquis SESSION ONE: PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS PANEL I BROAD OVERVIEW: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES Discussion Written contributions I Wouter Wils, The Use of in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles II Andreas Reindl, The Legal Framework Governing Negotiated Settlements/Plea Agreements in Cartel Cases in the United States III Aurora Ascione and Massimo Motta, in Cartel Cases IV Daniel Rubinfeld, in Antitrust Enforcement: A U.S. Economic Perspective V Stephen Wilks, A Political Science Approach: Restorative Justice and the Fairness Critique PANEL II A CLOSER LOOK FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ENFORCERS, DEFENDANTS, POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS, THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION Discussion Written contributions I Bruno Lasserre and Fabien Zivy, A Principled Approach to Settlements: A Few Open Issues II Ann O'Brien, Cartel in the U.S. and EU: Similarities, Differences and Remaining Questions III Mario Siragusa and Erika Guerri, Antitrust under EC Competition Law: The Point of View of the Defendants IV Shepard Goldfein and Thomas Pak, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some Perspectives from U.S. Defendants V Michael Hausfeld, Brian Ratner and Scott Campbell, Principles and Objectives of Formal and Informal in EU Competition Cases: The Claimant's Perspective VI Albrecht Bach, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some Perspectives from the Point of View of (Potential) Plaintiffs VII John Cooke, Negotiated under EC Competition Law: A Judicial Perspective VIII Diane Wood, Antitrust in the United States IX John Ratliff, Negotiated in EC Competition Law: The Perspective of the Legal Profession X John Taladay, Implications of International Cartel for Private Rights of Action SESSION TWO: SETTLEMENTS IN CARTEL CASES. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN MAJOR JURISDICTIONS PANEL III THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Discussion Written contributions I William Kovacic, Plea Bargaining and the Enforcement of Competition Law Against Cartels in the United States II Calvin Goldman, Rob Kwinter, Navin Joneja and Evangelia Litsa Kriaris, Cartel in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: A Canadian Perspective III Kirtikumar Mehta and Maria Luisa Tierno Centella, EU Settlement Public Enforcement Perspective PANEL IV FRANCE, GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM Discussion Written contributions I Bruno Lasserre and Fabien Zivy, A Principled Approach to Settlements: a few open issues1 II Eric Morgan de Rivery, The French Non-Contest Procedure: A Practitioner's Point of View III Jochen Burrichter, in Cartel Cases: Practical Experience in Germany IV Pieter Kalbfleisch, The Dutch Experience with Plea Bargaining/Direct V Onno Brouwer, Antitrust in the Netherlands: A Useful Source of Inspiration? VI Ali Nikpay and Deirdre Waters, The Emerging Regime in the UK: The Use of Settlements in Competition Act Cases VII Lynda Martin Alegi and Grant Murray, Settling an Appropriate Policy: Reflections on OFT Work in Progress SESSION THREE: COMMITMENT DECISIONS PANEL V SETTLEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF REGULATION 1/2003 Discussion Written contributions I Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC Practice and Case Law II Santiago Martinez Lage and Rafael Allendesalazar, Commitment Decisions ex Regulation 1/2003: Procedure and Effects SESSION FOUR: LESSONS TO BE DRAWN PANEL VI PART ONE: POLICY CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT Discussion PART TWO: POLICY CONSEQUENCES FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT Discussion PART THREE: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS Written contributions I Kirtikumar Mehta and Maria Luisa Tierno Centella, EU Settlement Public Enforcement Perspective2 II Ian Forrester, Creating New Rules? Or Closing Easy Cases? Policy Consequences for Public Enforcement of under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 III Kirsten Edwards and Jorge Padilla, Antitrust in the EU: Private Incentives and Enforcement Policy IV Kris Dekeyser, Rainer Becker and Daniele Calisti, Impact of Public Enforcement on Antitrust Damages Actions: Some Likely Effects of and Commitments on Private Actions for Damages V Lorenzo Coppi and Robert Levinson, The Interaction between and Private Litigation- An Economic Perspective
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,113 | 0,018 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; les deux têtes enseignantes s’accordent sur ce qui est montré ici.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».