Bibliographic record
Abstract
INTRODUCTION - CARTEL SETTLEMENTS AND COMMITMENT DECISIONS Mel Marquis SESSION ONE: PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS PANEL I BROAD OVERVIEW: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES Discussion Written contributions I Wouter Wils, The Use of in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles II Andreas Reindl, The Legal Framework Governing Negotiated Settlements/Plea Agreements in Cartel Cases in the United States III Aurora Ascione and Massimo Motta, in Cartel Cases IV Daniel Rubinfeld, in Antitrust Enforcement: A U.S. Economic Perspective V Stephen Wilks, A Political Science Approach: Restorative Justice and the Fairness Critique PANEL II A CLOSER LOOK FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ENFORCERS, DEFENDANTS, POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS, THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION Discussion Written contributions I Bruno Lasserre and Fabien Zivy, A Principled Approach to Settlements: A Few Open Issues II Ann O'Brien, Cartel in the U.S. and EU: Similarities, Differences and Remaining Questions III Mario Siragusa and Erika Guerri, Antitrust under EC Competition Law: The Point of View of the Defendants IV Shepard Goldfein and Thomas Pak, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some Perspectives from U.S. Defendants V Michael Hausfeld, Brian Ratner and Scott Campbell, Principles and Objectives of Formal and Informal in EU Competition Cases: The Claimant's Perspective VI Albrecht Bach, Negotiated Antitrust Settlements: Some Perspectives from the Point of View of (Potential) Plaintiffs VII John Cooke, Negotiated under EC Competition Law: A Judicial Perspective VIII Diane Wood, Antitrust in the United States IX John Ratliff, Negotiated in EC Competition Law: The Perspective of the Legal Profession X John Taladay, Implications of International Cartel for Private Rights of Action SESSION TWO: SETTLEMENTS IN CARTEL CASES. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN MAJOR JURISDICTIONS PANEL III THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION Discussion Written contributions I William Kovacic, Plea Bargaining and the Enforcement of Competition Law Against Cartels in the United States II Calvin Goldman, Rob Kwinter, Navin Joneja and Evangelia Litsa Kriaris, Cartel in Criminal and Civil Proceedings: A Canadian Perspective III Kirtikumar Mehta and Maria Luisa Tierno Centella, EU Settlement Public Enforcement Perspective PANEL IV FRANCE, GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM Discussion Written contributions I Bruno Lasserre and Fabien Zivy, A Principled Approach to Settlements: a few open issues1 II Eric Morgan de Rivery, The French Non-Contest Procedure: A Practitioner's Point of View III Jochen Burrichter, in Cartel Cases: Practical Experience in Germany IV Pieter Kalbfleisch, The Dutch Experience with Plea Bargaining/Direct V Onno Brouwer, Antitrust in the Netherlands: A Useful Source of Inspiration? VI Ali Nikpay and Deirdre Waters, The Emerging Regime in the UK: The Use of Settlements in Competition Act Cases VII Lynda Martin Alegi and Grant Murray, Settling an Appropriate Policy: Reflections on OFT Work in Progress SESSION THREE: COMMITMENT DECISIONS PANEL V SETTLEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF REGULATION 1/2003 Discussion Written contributions I Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC Practice and Case Law II Santiago Martinez Lage and Rafael Allendesalazar, Commitment Decisions ex Regulation 1/2003: Procedure and Effects SESSION FOUR: LESSONS TO BE DRAWN PANEL VI PART ONE: POLICY CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT Discussion PART TWO: POLICY CONSEQUENCES FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT Discussion PART THREE: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS Written contributions I Kirtikumar Mehta and Maria Luisa Tierno Centella, EU Settlement Public Enforcement Perspective2 II Ian Forrester, Creating New Rules? Or Closing Easy Cases? Policy Consequences for Public Enforcement of under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 III Kirsten Edwards and Jorge Padilla, Antitrust in the EU: Private Incentives and Enforcement Policy IV Kris Dekeyser, Rainer Becker and Daniele Calisti, Impact of Public Enforcement on Antitrust Damages Actions: Some Likely Effects of and Commitments on Private Actions for Damages V Lorenzo Coppi and Robert Levinson, The Interaction between and Private Litigation- An Economic Perspective
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.009 | 0.017 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.008 | 0.008 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.010 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.014 | 0.011 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.035 | 0.006 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".