China’s unfolding Arctic strategy : threatening or opportunistic?

Rapid climatic changes in the Arctic—the fast melting of permafrost, the decline of glaciers, \nthe melting of sea ice—have created perceived strategic and economic opportunities for the littoral \nstates, but have also attracted the attention of states beyond the region. China, for example, without \ndirect access to the Arctic, displays an interest in Arctic research, natural resources, and shipping \npotential. However, its diplomatic, economic, political and scientific efforts in this region arouse \nnegative reactions among Western media. The media often draw up a portrait of an ambitious and \narrogant China, ready to push aside the sovereignty of the Arctic countries to defend Chinese interests in the Arctic. From this perspective, it seems relevant to analyse China’s activities in the region \nand try to assess Beijing’s strategy in the Arctic, which seems more driven by opportunism than by \na long-term desire to challenge the littoral states’ sovereignty. \nThe commercial and strategic implications of climate change and the melting of the sea ice \nin the Arctic have drawn attention not only of Arctic states but also of some other countries that \nhave no territorial access to the region, such as China and Japan. The growing Chinese interest in \nthe Arctic appears to be a rather recent phenomenon.1 \n There have been many publications and \nconsiderable speculation on that topic, resulting in the construction of an image of a potentially \nthreatening China, which is often described as being very interested in both Arctic mineral resources and the opening of Arctic shipping routes. In addition, China increasingly describes itself as a \n“near-Arctic” [ ]state,2 \n as if attempting to legitimize its growing interest in the region. But \nin this characterization, there is a hint of a perceived threat, as commentators are often stressing that \nChina’s appetite may lead Beijing into considering the Northwest Passage as an international strait, \nand Arctic resources as up for grabs. Thus, the intensified interest of the world community towards \nthe Arctic and towards China’s growing presence in this region have raised several questions. What \ndoes China’s interest in the Arctic denote regarding its long-term goals? What is the scale of China’s \npolar research and collaboration? What is the official position of the Chinese government towards \nthe Arctic? What strategy has Beijing developed regarding Arctic issues—of sovereignty of Arctic \nstates, the exploitation of natural resources, and the development of new navigation passages? In \nfact, after lengthy speculations, China eventually published its Arctic policy in January 2018,3 \n but \ndoes not wish to, nor does it represent a threat to claims put forward by Arctic coastal states.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.