Democracy and local government reform in Britain 1996-2010 – Some lessons for implementing Putting People First?
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
The package of proposals contained in Putting People First document, the Report\nof the Local Electoral Area Boundary Committee and the Final Report of the Local\nGovernment/Local Development Alignment Steering Group, taken in conjunction\nwith the introduction of the Residential Property Tax and the incorporation of\nenterprise development bodies in local government represent the most significant\nset of local government reforms articulated by an Irish government since the\nintroduction of the city/county manager system. In particular the focus on making\nlocal public policy making more democratic and accountable is particularly\nnoteworthy. The implementation of these policy initiatives has now commenced\nwith the publication of the Local Government Bill, 2013.\nIreland is not unusual in seeking to radically reform the operation of the state at\nlocal level. Andrews and Boyne (2012, 297-298) note that policy makers across the\nworld continue to debate the merits of alternative local government structures in\nterms of their consequences for local service costs and performance. In recent years\nseveral countries have enacted or considered reorganizations of local government\non the grounds of efficiency. Examples include Denmark where the number of local\ngovernment units was reduced from 270 to 98 in 2007, and there is further ongoing\ndiscussion about another reduction. Similarly, in Australia and Canada, debates\nhave long raged about the amalgamation of local governments (Vojnovic 2000; King\net al. 2004, Dollery et al. 2009). At the same time, it seems likely that the current\nera of fiscal austerity will increase the pressure on governments to reform and/or\nreorganize local government.\nTis article proposes that the implementation Irish local government reform\nprogramme should take heed of previous and similar reform processes in order for\nthe changes it proposes to be embedded and successful (Wollman 2008). In\nadditions it suggests that the reforms may have very significant implications for\nplanners, the planning process and the planning system. Tis is particularly the\ncase in relation to the proposals that seek to improve the rather limited democratic\n1 Lowndes and Pratchett (2012, 22) suggest that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat reforms do “show traces\nof an ideological commitment to localism and a new understanding of local self-government”. In addition,\nthey note that there is “an ideological agenda which has the potential to deliver a radically different form\nof local governance” (ibid.). However, the reform process is far from coherent and the potential for radical\nchange is heavily constrained by a number of factors, including:\nThe conflicting ideologies of both parties, e.g. one-nation Conservatism, new right post-Thatcherism and a\ndistinctive blend of liberalism and community politics;\nThe political expediency of budget cuts aimed at changing Britain’s economic position before the 2015\nGeneral Election. This expediency promotes a short-termism that is not necessarily compatible with the\npublicly stated longer term goals of local self-government.\nPleanáil: Journal of the Irish Planning Institute. Issue 19, Winter 2013 18\nlegitimacy of Irish local government. The article itself is divided into three parts.\nThe first provides a rationale for Britain as a comparator and the choice of the 1996-\n2010 period, as well as a brief introduction to the terms used in the article. Tis is\nfollowed by an examination of the British case and an analysis of the evidence to\ndate on the implications that arose for the planning process and planning system\nin Britain. The final part of the article provides an overview of the pertinent lessons\narising from these reform processes.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,002 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,003 | 0,006 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,010 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».