Psychology, Emotions, and Richard Nixon’s withdrawal from the Vietnam War, 1969-1973

This dissertation explores the emotional impulses and psychological dynamics that influenced president Richard Nixon’s decision-making in the Vietnam War from 1969 to 1973, shedding light on how these factors shaped what is often considered a quintessentially “realist” moment in the history of U.S. foreign relations. Combining archival research with an emerging “emotional turn” in foreign policy analysis and international relations history, this project shows that Nixon’s protracted withdrawal from Vietnam can be more fully understood by taking emotions and psychology more fully into account. It argues that his policies reflected a fixation with the psychology of others, especially those of fretful or dependent allies, weary adversaries supposedly close to their breaking point, and “emotional” Americans contemplating a precipitous withdrawal; his policies also reflected, however, under-appreciation for the psychological and emotional imperatives influencing his own perceptions and decisions. This dissertation analyzes the impact of decidedly “uncool” emotions and psychology on Nixon’s and national security advisor Henry Kissinger’s major decisions in Vietnam: the secret bombing of Cambodia and the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969; the invasion of Cambodia in 1970; the invasion of Laos in 1971; and the Linebacker campaigns and the fitful abandonment of South Vietnam of 1972. Although the influence of emotions and psychology is assessed in wide-ranging ways, this project makes three important contributions to the existing literature on Nixon’s Vietnam War: Nixon and Kissinger formed an “emotional community” that prevented them from accepting anything less than what they perceived as “Peace with Honor”; a series of heuristics, loss aversion being chief among them, framed Nixon and Kissinger’s perception that Vietnam had the potential of unmaking the American Century, a perception that allowed them to rationalize several risky escalations; Nixon and Kissinger’s policies both were predicated on “emotional management” and faltered due to a lack thereof. Ultimately, this project not only disrupts the traditional narrative of Nixon and Kissinger as “realist” exemplars in U.S. foreign policy, but it also adds layers of complexity to established narratives about the influence of Realpolitik on U.S. foreign relations in general and therefore deepens our understanding of U.S. foreign policy overall.

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