Notice bibliographique
Résumé
After more than five decades of hostility, embargo, and diplomatic frigidity, December 17, 2014 brought news of the seemingly impossible--the beginnings of a thaw in relations between the United States and Cuba. The man at the center of it all, credited with fostering the deal: Pope Francis. It has been revealed that the Holy See had been mediating secret negotiations between Havana and Washington for 18 months in Canada and at the Vatican. The pope himself wrote letters of appeal to Presidents Barack Obama and Raul Castro that helped to catalyze the reconciliation. While many hail this first step towards peace as miraculous small but vocal minority are bitter and disparaging of the news--mostly Cuban-Americans who fled from Fidel Castro's regime. For them, the diplomatic thaw diminishes their experience of oppression under Fidel Castro, and they are not convinced that the Cuban government will make any human rights concessions, even as Obama sets out to persuade Congress to dismantle economic sanctions. Furthermore, since Cuban Americans are overwhelmingly Catholic, many feel betrayed by the key role of their spiritual leader. Following the announcement, Miami resident Efrain Rivas, a political prisoner in Cuba for 16 years, stated, I'm still Catholic till the day I die, but I am a Catholic without a pope. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] These reactions are understandable, but on the whole, the international community should be buoyed by the announcements. As President Obama said, the US policy of isolating Cuba was rigid and outdated. It is only openness to discussion, negotiation, and cooperation that will bring Cuba the economic benefits, and most importantly, the human rights improvements, that are so desperately needed. While the embargo imposed indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban people, a more open relationship may bring better results. There is precedent for this perspective. Many credit China's meteoric rise over the past few decades to US President Nixon's diplomatic work in 1972, which formally normalized relations with the People's Republic. Likewise, the opportunity promised by trade between Cuba and the United States will surely be leveraged by Washington and Havana to better the lives of Cubans. These talks are just the beginning of a more open diplomatic relationship that will lead to the exchange of the goods, people, and ideas that should bring serious change to a country so long cut off from progress. So how did Pope Francis work this miracle? And might his peacemaking powers be similarly effective in the Middle East, or in other areas of conflict? For as long as there have been popes, they have been key players in international relations and peacemaking. Even as early as the fifth century, by which time the Latin honorific papa had been reserved for the bishop of Rome, Pope Leo the Great (440-461) personally persuaded Attila the Hun to withdraw from Italy and spare Rome. Charlemagne, the king who united much of Western Europe, was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III (795-816). The papacy crowned Holy Roman Emperors through to the 15th century, and ruled as kings over what were then the Papal States. More recently, Pope John Paul II (1978-2005) visited 129 countries as pope, strengthened relations with countless other world religions, had a hand in the collapse of several dictators, and has been credited as being a key player in the fall of communism in Europe. The Vatican has long exercised a policy of dialogue with any and all parties (though previous popes have used varying approaches and levels of caution) and has become a key player in mediating heated international disputes. Pope Francis' efforts in Cuba fit in with this tradition, but his success, after decades of failure, demands deeper review. Jonathan Powell, the chief British negotiator who brought about peace with Northern Ireland in 1998 following decades of tension and violence, believes there are two conditions necessary for successful peace negotiations. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,002 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; les deux têtes enseignantes s’accordent sur ce qui est montré ici.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».