Bibliographic record
Abstract
In history of writing about attributes of mind, concept of has assumed priority, time and again, as primary mode of cognition. From St Augustine's storehouse of through to movie-in-the-brain account of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, returns as a real presence in figuring prereflective conditions for thinking and, by extension, writing. It has always been imposed as important attribute of because it leads thinking subject back to authentic conditions of its possibility: common-sense processes of recognition, referencing, and representation; as such, it demarcates ground zero of cognitive deployment. Spinoza, following a long philosophical tradition of rendering cognition in visual terms, elects to retain the customary words in his Ethics: the affections of human Body whose ideas present external as present to us, we shall call of things, even if they do reproduce figures of things. And when Mind regards in this way, we shall say that it imagines (465). Yet he is careful to contain fallout of his linguistically expedient usage by emphasizing distinct modes that characterize thought, language, and representation (the mind's imaging of external bodies). is strictly image-based; it consists, rather, in ideas. The philosophical prejudice that regards ideas as images which are formed in us from encounters with bodies cannot get past view of ideas as mute pictures on a panel (486). This pictorial notion is firmly rejected by Spinoza: an idea (since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in of anything, nor in words. Ideas are not that are formed at back of eye (and, if you like, in middle of brain), but concepts of Thought (484). Such concepts are really a function of affirmation and negation rather than any faculty mind may have for imaging traces of bodily experience. Deleuze and Guattari, whose debt to Spinoza is well known, also speak of in its relation to thought. Like Spinoza, they too are careful to distance from any notion of figurative reproduction. In their final collaborative work, What is Phl1osophy?, image of thought emerges as a figure but as a kind of event horizon, a plane of immanence that lays out indivisible milieu for distribution of concepts:
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".