Bibliographic record
Abstract
The preceding sections of this book have been structured and presented in the following way. Initially, a number of significant questions were raised having to with the relative overall importance and apparent relative functionality of philosophical thinking and pursuit in relation to those things we appear to consider as most important. Questions explored here have been along the lines of: what is the status of our collective philosophical thinking when we consider how we commonly tend to expend our thinking energy in the pursuit of our endeavours; in other words, to what extent is philosophical thinking and the work of philosophy important to how we carry out our lives? In the current era, why does philosophical thinking, and the work and outputs of such thinking, appear to have such a low status (to the extent of vanishing, for all intents and purposes) in relation to what seem to be our main concerns and interests? From consideration of this question, can we safely entertain the idea that we tend to deny philosophical thinking and philosophical work to various extents; and, if this is so, why might this me be the case? How can we most usefully think about what the costs might be of denying philosophical thinking and philosophical work? Are we even aware that this situation might exist and may be expanding in scope and impact? Entertaining and commencing the exploration of such questions in the first section opened the door to the possibility that, collectively, we are faced with a very serious challenge that might be best cast in terms of a potentially fatal philosophical problem — fatal not only to philosophy, but fatal to what we appear to have begun to construct as a prosperous world that we hope will be for all.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.007 | 0.013 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.008 | 0.060 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.013 | 0.025 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.010 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.009 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.009 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".