Foreign Direct Investment in Canadian Banking: Is There a Case for Special Treatment?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper addresses a paradox. Although foreign ownership in Canadian banking is not restricted and was not restricted for 115 of the 140 years since Confederation, Canadian policy from the 1960s onwards has ensured that major banks have remained firmly under Canadian control. The paper examines the policies that have achieved this result and considers the implications of changes that would make the financial sector more open to foreign direct investment. This paper concentrates on the banking sector for several reasons. Banking is a key sector that should remain Canadian owned and controlled industries to a greater degree than other industries and other parts of the financial system. The industry has had a shifting array of rules starting with absolute prohibition on foreign entry in 1967 through a more permissive approach today that allows operations through both branches and subsidiaries. Foreign ownership has been less contentious for the life insurance and securities businesses, two other components of the financial sector. Life insurers were offered the opportunity to convert to mutual ownership in the 1950s to keep them from falling under foreign control. In the 1990s, recognizing the limitations of the mutual form of organization, the government offered mutual companies the opportunities to convert back into joint stock companies. Now, large insurance companies are subject to similar ownership rules as banks. With two of Canada’s companies being among the 10 largest international companies, ownership issues appear to be less of a concern than in banking. The question of foreign control of the securities industry flared up briefly in the 1960s and again in the 1980s and has been quiet ever since. Foreign securities firms have come and gone, sometimes the same firm repeatedly, with little notice.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.009 | 0.008 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.005 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".