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Record W1486237550

ASYMMETRY AND COLLUSION IN INFINITELY REPEATED CONTESTS

2005· preprint· en· W1486237550 on OpenAlexaff
J. Atsu Amegashie

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2005
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCONTESTCollusionEconomicsAggregate (composite)MicroeconomicsRent-seekingInformation asymmetryContrast (vision)Repeated gameComplete informationEconometricsAsymmetryGame theoryComputer sciencePolitics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

I show that in an infinitely repeated contest, collusion is easier to sustain when the players are more equal than when they are less equal. Therefore, aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be lower when the contestants are more equally matched. This is in sharp contrast to the standard result in static rent-seeking contests where increasing asymmetries between players reduce aggregate expenditures. I also discuss how this result has implications for signaling in contests with incomplete information.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.031
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.013
Threshold uncertainty score0.042

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.031
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.005
Scholarly communication0.0050.005
Open science0.0020.005
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.063
GPT teacher head0.397
Teacher spread0.333 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations10
Published2005
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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