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Record W1487783860

Optimal Rationing in IPOs with Risk Averse Institutional Investors

2005· article· en· W1487783860 on OpenAlexaff
Moez Bennouri, Sonia Falconieri

Bibliographic record

VenueRivista di Politica Economica · 2005
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsRationingInitial public offeringInstitutional investorInformation asymmetryCredit rationingMicroeconomicsMechanism (biology)EconomicsOptimal allocationMechanism designBusinessRisk aversion (psychology)Monetary economicsExpected utility hypothesisFinancial economicsFinanceMathematical optimizationInterest rateMathematics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Using a mechanism design approach, we derive endogenously the optimal IPO mechanism when institutional investors are risk averse. We show that the optimal allocation rule is such that all the institutional investors with sufficiently good information are allocated a positive quantity of shares which is increasing in the quality of the their information. Additionally, we also derive the optimal rationing scheme which is uniform, i.e. all institutional investors are rationed by the same amount of shares [JEL Classification: D8, G2]. In questo articolo, usando un approccio di mechanism de-sign, deriviamo endogenamente il meccanismo di offerta pubblica ottimale quando gli investitori istituzionali sono avversi al rischio. Il meccanismo è tale per cui tutti gli investitori istituzionali con un’informazione sufficientemente buona ricevono una quantità positiva di azioni, che risulta inoltre crescente nella qualità del-l’informazione. Infine, deriviamo anche lo schema di razionamen-to ottimale che è uniforme cioè tutti gli investitori istituzionali sono razionati per un uguale numero di azioni.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.811
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.037
GPT teacher head0.311
Teacher spread0.274 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2005
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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