Public Power for Industry: A Re-Examination of the New Brunswick Case, 1940-1960
Bibliographic record
Abstract
WHEN UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK STUDENTS staged their satirical Winter Carnival musical in 1958, they chose as their target the provincial government’s new development strategy. “We gotta have power/ we gotta have power”, chorus members sang, “we gotta have power/ cause the kilowatt hour is the only thing that’s gonna save No Brewswick”.1 Power was an easy target – perhaps as easy as the province’s archaic liquor laws. For throughout the 1950s, New Brunswickers were inundated with speeches, newspaper articles and radio broadcasts promoting the economic benefits of publicly-sponsored electrical development. Both the Progressive Conservative government of Hugh John Flemming and the province’s public power utility, the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC), claimed that “power was the key” that was going to “unlock the treasure chest of resources” in New Brunswick. The treasure sought by provincial leaders was not located in the traditional growth sector of the provincial economy, the forests, but in the recently-discovered motherlode of minerals in northern and western New Brunswick. During the 1950s, and to a lesser extent the 1960s, mineral development was the principal focus of economic planners in New Brunswick. In order to facilitate development of the new mineral staple, the government and the utility followed a “power for industry” growth model based on the provision of inexpensive electricity to heavy industry. New Brunswick’s “power for industry” strategy was an attempt by the province to share in the benefits of the Second National Policy, which was emerging in Canada during the post-war era. Like the original National Policy, the Second National Policy, in Janine Brodie’s words, was “an amalgam of several distinct policy initiatives, which together constituted a model for economic growth and development”.2 In
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.009 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.031 | 0.012 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.017 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.011 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.012 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".