ANC Analytical Payoff Functions for Networks with Endogenous Bilateral Long Cheap Talk
Bibliographic record
Abstract
We improve upon "a, b, c or d " in three-agent Aumann-Myerson (1988) (A-M) like network games with any valuation function or any payoff allocation rule. We do so by assuming understandable "long-bounded-cheap talk " in the A-M link proposal game. In A-M, the decision to form a bilateral communication link by pairs of agents depends on (a) "fixed " Myerson (1977) values−a payoff allo-cation rule−of the induced graphs; (b) inefficiency and (c) multiple equilibria are possible. Cheap talk in the A-M game is modelled in an almost non coop-erative (ANC) way: (1) Pairs bargain in a smooth Nash (1950) demand game over credible expected payoffs induced by Nash equilibria of a (2) simultane-ous double proposal−payoffs and future bilateral coordination schemes−game. A link forms if double proposals "coincide " and payoff proposals add to the sum of the two agents ’ Myerson (1977) values in the prospective graph.(3) It is "almost " assumed that schemes are reminded chronologically "behind closed doors " as there is "almost " a natural first-mover advantage. From (1), the decision to form a link depends on a "variable Myerson value pair " that ac-counts for future possibilities of link formation. From (3), the key multiplicity problem in A-M with conflicting requests of two agents towards a an indifferent third one is solved; as coordination on requests by earlier linked pairs prevails if credible. Outcomes are efficient. ANC analytical payoff functions exist for all A-M like games. We state some of the complete key formulas and other results only derived for the A-M game: In strictly superadditive games, only two link graphs form. If a one link-coalition of two agents-forms then they can achieve what the grand coalition can. Issue (d): particularity of results ∗Thanks to Leonid Hurwicz; Maria Montero, Roger Myerson, Roberto Serrano-for referring me kindly to his related papers-, Jun Wako and David Levine-that made me aware "in a minute " that I may had been dealing with cheap talk. Originally: "An Extension of the Aumann-Myerson..." 1
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".