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Record W1523267497 · doi:10.4271/2009-01-3171

Integrated Safety Management System

2009· article· en· W1523267497 on OpenAlexaff
Michael Kavoliunas, Zdzislaw H. Klim, Dragan Komljenović

Bibliographic record

VenueSAE International Journal of Aerospace · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicRisk and Safety Analysis
Canadian institutionsBombardier (Canada)
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSystems engineeringComputer scienceEngineeringAeronautics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The Safety Management System requires a structured Risk Management Process to be effective. In the technical fields where numerous potentially catastrophic risks exist, processes and procedures need to account not only for the hardware random failures but also of human errors. The technology has progressed to the point where the predominant safety risks are not so much the machine failures but that of the human interaction. Accidents are rarely the result of a single cause but of a number of latent contributing factors that when combined result in the accident. In the Aerospace industry, the operational risk to the fleet is assessed by the manufacturer and the operator independently and is used in safety and/or regulatory decision-making. For the manufacturer, the risk assessment is a philosophy whereby risk of a potential or actual occurrence is evaluated in comparison to the event analyzed in the system safety assessment or structural analysis performed for certification of the product. The resulting safety decision-making process involves integration of the probabilistic risk assessment, deterministic and severity perception elements such that the decisions made leads to corrective or preventative actions. The evaluations of the human factors elements are subjectively assessed based on individual experience based criteria and are difficult to integrate into the safety decision. The risk assessment is viewed as the process that records all these factors as the basis for the safety decision and prioritization of the corrective actions. In the Nuclear industry a risk-informed approach to safety and/or regulatory decision-making represents a philosophy whereby risk insights are considered together with other factors, including good engineering practice and experience, to establish the design requirements and operational issues commensurate with their importance to public health and safety. A standard risk-based approach to safety and/or regulatory decision-making is one in which a decision is based solely on the numerical results of a risk assessment. Quantitative risk analyses are important inputs to decision making, but they do not constitute an adequate or sufficient base of information for addressing the complex issues that face the nuclear power industry. For that reason such analyses are only one of the many contributing inputs to a comprehensive risk-informed decision making process. Risk-informed decision making involves integration of probabilistic, deterministic and non-quantifiable elements such that, overall, the decisions made lead to a resolution of the issue being considered that is commensurate with its risk-significance and is better to that likely to be reached if any approach is used in isolation. This paper intends to compare the Risk Management methodologies and procedures used in the Aerospace and Nuclear industries to highlight similarities and differences. The learning from these differences may then identify potential improvements to either methodology.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.415
Threshold uncertainty score0.834

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0040.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0050.003
Open science0.0030.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.4150.308

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.031
GPT teacher head0.346
Teacher spread0.315 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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