MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W1531647055 · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0909.5677

Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions

2009· preprint· en· W1531647055 on OpenAlexaff
Brendan Lucier

Bibliographic record

VenueArXiv.org · 2009
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCombinatorial auctionRegretCommon value auctionBiddingComputer scienceMathematical optimizationMechanism designClass (philosophy)Auction algorithmFocus (optics)Space (punctuation)Reduction (mathematics)Auction theoryMathematical economicsMathematicsRevenue equivalenceArtificial intelligenceEconomicsMachine learningMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either apply common learning techniques to minimize the regret of their bidding strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a black-box approximation algorithm for the base auction problem be converted into a mechanism that approximately preserves the original algorithm's approximation factor on average over many iterations? We present a general reduction for a broad class of algorithms when agents minimize external regret. We also present a new mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem that attains an $O(\sqrt{m})$ approximation on average when agents apply best-response dynamics.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.043
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.008
Threshold uncertainty score0.044

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.043
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.003
Scholarly communication0.0050.009
Open science0.0050.003
Research integrity0.0040.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.141
GPT teacher head0.395
Teacher spread0.254 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations4
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueArXiv.orgSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207