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Issue Salience, Party Strength, and the Adoption of Health‐Care Expansion Efforts

2012· article· en· W1532592168 on OpenAlex
Ethan M. Bernick, Nathan Myers

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenuePolitics &amp Policy · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicPolicy Transfer and Learning
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSalience (neuroscience)IncentivePolitical scienceWelfare economicsSalientHealth careHumanitiesPublic economicsEconomicsPsychologyLawPhilosophyMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This article studies the joint effects of issue salience and party strength on health‐care expansion efforts in the American states. We contend that Democrats and Republicans fall back on their traditional policy stances when an issue is highly salient, but when it is less so, policy makers move to the more politically practical policy alternatives. We find that when health care is highly salient, Democrat‐controlled states will be more likely to support direct coverage programs, while a Republican‐controlled state will be more likely to support tax incentives. During periods of low‐issue salience, policy makers are more open to pursuing options less consonant with traditional partisan policy preferences to make progress on the issue. This important contribution to the literature indicates that the level of attention an issue receives can not only affect whether effort is made to address the problem, but the substance of the policy too. Este artículo estudia los efectos conjuntos de la relevancia de un problema y la fuerza de un partido respecto a los esfuerzos de expansión de la cobertura médica en los estados de la unión americana. Nosotros argumentamos que Demócratas y Republicanos mantienen sus posturas políticas tradicionales cuando un problema es altamente relevante, de lo contrario, los legisladores toman una alternativa política más práctica. Hallamos que cuando la cobertura médica es altamente relevante, los estados Demócratas serán más propensos a apoyar programas de cobertura directa, mientras que los estados Republicanos serán más propensos a apoyar incentivos fiscales. Durante periodos de poca relevancia, los legisladores están más abiertos a considerar medidas con una menor consonancia política a la de su partido con el fin de lograr avances en el tema. Esta importante contribución a la literatura indica que el nivel de atención que recibe un problema no sólo afecta si se toman medidas para resolver el problema sino la solidez de la política implementada también. Related Articles: “Implementation Theory Revisited . . . Again,” (2009): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00174.x/abstract “National Health Insurance in the U.S. and Canada,” (2009): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00211.x/abstract “Issue Salience, News Coverage, and Attention Cycles,” (1999): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2007.00113.x/abstract

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.912
Threshold uncertainty score0.963

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.029
GPT teacher head0.365
Teacher spread0.335 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it