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Record W1541407081 · doi:10.1108/17439131211216594

Ownership structure, earnings management and acquiring firm post‐merger market performance

2012· article· en· W1541407081 on OpenAlexaff
Claude Francœur, Walid Ben‐Amar, Philémon Rakoto

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Managerial Finance · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsUniversity of OttawaHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsAccrualShareholderEarnings managementEarningsStock (firearms)BusinessAccountingStock marketEvent studyMonetary economicsVotingFinanceEconomicsCorporate governance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between ownership structure, earnings management (EM) preceding mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and the acquiring firm's subsequent long‐term market performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors measure the magnitude of discretionary current accruals using two methodologies, that of Teoh et al. and that of Kothari et al. The latter methodology is used to control for the presence of extreme performance prior to the event. The calendar‐time Fama‐French three‐factor model was used to evaluate long‐term stock performance and to minimize potential problems related to the cross‐sectional dependence of the returns. Findings It was found that firms using stock as a financing medium exhibit significant positive discretionary accruals during the year preceding the M&A and during the year of the acquisition. It was also documented that voting right concentration and control‐enhancing mechanisms are not associated with any significant level of earnings management. Finally, a negative association was found between EM and abnormal stock returns over a three‐year period following the acquisition. Research limitations/implications These results suggest that the concentrated ownership alignment effect dominates the entrenchment motives and acts as a deterrent mechanism to prevent controlling shareholders from managing earnings in stock‐financed M&A. Practical implications The authors’ results highlight the importance of maintaining good legal and extra‐legal protection of minority shareholders. Regulators can play an important role in preventing dominant shareholders from engaging in opportunistic EM in stock‐financed M&A. Originality/value The paper extends prior literature by taking a closer look at dominant shareholders’ motivations to manage earnings in stock‐financed M&A. Large shareholders have strong incentives to manage earnings upward prior to stock‐financed transactions to limit the dilution of their controlling position.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.002
Threshold uncertainty score0.007

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.011
GPT teacher head0.207
Teacher spread0.197 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations19
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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