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Record W1559879269 · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511667060.004

Theory of the firm and corporate social strategy

2010· book-chapter· en· W1559879269 on OpenAlexaff
Bryan W. Husted, David Allen

Bibliographic record

VenueCambridge University Press eBooks · 2010
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic Theory and Institutions
Canadian institutionsYork University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBusinessIndustrial organization

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The theory of the firm is ultimately concerned with the purpose of the firm itself. Neoclassical economic theory has generally taken profit or shareholder value maximization as the appropriate objective of the firm (Jensen, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). A strategic approach to corporate social action does not dispute this basic objective. Now some may claim that firms should maximize both profits and social performance. Although social strategy is focused on understanding the conditions under which profit maximization and social performance are congruent, we face an important constraint noted by Jensen (2002: 238) who indicated that it is “logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are monotone transformations of one another.” This constraint implies that profits and social performance cannot be maximized simultaneously. In other words, there is a trade-off between profits and social performance, except in the special case where they mutually reinforce each other. Jensen’s exception points to situations in which it may be possible to achieve both objectives at the same time – investment in corporate social projects needs to contribute to profit maximization. Our challenge is to determine the conditions that this requirement imposes upon social projects. The discipline of economics has looked at these questions in terms of the private provision of public goods (Demsetz, 1970; Keim, 1978; Thoreen, 1981; Baron, 2001). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) have recently discussed the supply and demand conditions that would lead to optimal investment in social projects by the firm. Using the tools of microeconomic analysis, this chapter explores the conditions under which firm investment in social initiatives is consistent with shareholder value maximization, and in so doing points to an avenue for research and practice that may in fact be quite promising. It also sketches some ideas about the advisability of the firm making investments to solve social problems and about the optimal amount of social output to be produced by the firm. We develop this argument by looking at three different cases: the firm as altruist, as coerced egoist, and as strategist. In each case, we consider both the benefits obtained by the firm from its social projects as well as their costs.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.009
Threshold uncertainty score0.045

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.009
Scholarly communication0.0040.003
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.052
GPT teacher head0.178
Teacher spread0.126 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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