Bibliographic record
Abstract
By the conclusion of Book I of the Treatise, Hume faces something of a dilemma.Because of the skeptical arguments of part 4, he is "ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (T 268-9).*Yet on the other hand, he clearly does think that some methods of belief-formation are better than others.Five paragraphs after the passage just cited, he proclaims, "I make bold to recommend philosophy, and shall not scruple to give it the preference to superstition of every kind and denomination" (T 271).Although it is difficult to take much of what Hume says in part 4 (and especially section 7) at face value, it is clear that Hume is sincere in his endorsement of philosophy here.Book I, after all, is only the first of the three books of the Treatise, and the other two books begin just four (Selby-Bigge) pages after this endorsement.The skeptical ar- guments examined throughout the Treatise seem to indicate that we cannot show that many, if any, of our beliefs have a high probability of being true, and yet Hume wants to maintain a distinction between better and worse methods of belief-formation.On what could such a distinction be founded?Notoriously, there are several different themes in the Treatise that look like they might play some role; at various points in the Treatise, Hume mentions the involuntariness of belief, the pleasure derived from philosophy, the love of truth, the distinction between the more and less universal workings of the mind, and so forth.Not surprisingly, there is a good deal of debate among Hume's commentators as to which of these themes is actually at work ~ ~~~~~~~~
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.007 | 0.019 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.019 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".