Limitations on the Market Power Generated by the Single Desk of the Canadian Wheat Board
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Prior to 2012, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was a dominant regulatory force in the Canadian grain sector. This paper looks at the historical justifications of the single desk authority of the CWB and reviews previous research examining its performance. In a simulation of price discrimination based on 2013 wheat markets, a possible premium of $7.60/metric tonne is generated assuming a price discriminating CWB. The implications of recent changes in the grain market are discussed, including the increasing area seeded to canola in Canada and the removal of the single desk for the Australian Wheat Board. While the model, as assumed, suggests the CWB's market power was increased by these changes, these gains are reliant on the model assumptions and are modest compared to the recent rise in grain prices and the potential for gains and losses observed in recent export basis variation. Avant 2012, la Commission canadienne du blé (CCB) était une autorité dominante dans le secteur canadien des grains. Dans le présent article, nous examinons les justifications historiques du monopole de la CCB et nous passons en revue les recherches antérieures qui en ont analysé le rendement. D'après une simulation de discrimination par les prix fondée sur les données du marché du blé en 2013, l'hypothèse d'une discrimination par les prix de la part de la CCB engendrerait une prime possible de 7,60 $/tonne métrique. Nous traitons des répercussions des récents changements sur le marché des grains, y compris l'accroissement des superficies consacrées à la culture du canola au Canada et l'abolition du monopole de la Commission australienne du blé (CAB). Bien que le modèle, comme nous l'avions supposé, autorise à penser que les récents changements ont accru le pouvoir de marché de la CCB, ces gains dépendent des hypothèses du modèle et sont modérés comparativement à la hausse récente du prix des grains et au potentiel de gains et de pertes observé dans le récent écart du seuil d'exportation.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".