Can't See the Forest for the Trees: Where Does a Purchase or Sale of Securities Occur
Bibliographic record
Abstract
INTRODUCTIONWhether Justice Scalia chopped down the judicial oak which ha[d] grown from little more than a legislative acorn1 or cleared an entire forest of botanically distinct tree[s]2 when he created the transactional test in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., he undoubtedly changed the legal landscape for both international and antifraud securities laws. The transactional test-which the Supreme Court designed to act as a bright-line rule to supplant the older and effects tests developed by the Second Circuit- gauges whether a U.S. court can hear an antifraud securities case containing extraterritorial elements.3 In clearing away decades of federal extraterritorial jurisprudence, Morrison dictates that an American court may no longer hear an antifraud securities case under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)4 and Rule 10b-55 unless the or of securities occurred within the United States.6Since its creation, the transactional test has gained both positive and negative attention from the international legal community.7 But after the hundreds of securities class action cases adjudicated since the day of the decision,8 the question remains: Does the transactional test clarify when an international securities antifraud claim falls within U.S. jurisdiction?This Article will show that while Justice Scalia may have cut down the occasionally thorny and effects tests, the seeds he planted with the transactional test may be just as difficult to care for and administer. Courts must now grapple with defining the purchase and sale of a securities transaction, and then determine whether such actions occurred within the United States. Within a complex global marketplace experiencing frequent cross-border activity, such terms are not easily defined and lead to contrary holdings on similar fact patterns.Part I of this Article looks at how courts were able to avoid the terms purchase and sale prior to Morrison. Part II examines how Morrison used those terms in its decision. Part III analyzes how courts have thus far interpreted the Morrison transactional test and breaks down the various methods used in reaching their decisions. Finally, Part IV suggests a method for unifying the disparate methods of identifying whether a securities transaction is domestic or not.I. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF PURCHASE OR SALE LANGUAGE PRIOR TO MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK, LTD.Although courts prior to the Morrison decision agreed that there should be an extraterritorial reach for antifraud provisions, there was little consensus as to how it should be applied.9 Most private parties rely on Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 to bring a transnational securities fraud case within the United States.10 The broad language of both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was written to close[] a loophole in the protections against fraud.11 Thus, courts determined that Congress meant for Section 10(b) to protect investors regardless of whether they purchased or sold securities on U.S. markets.12 To determine if there was a sufficient jurisdictional nexus between the conduct abroad and the investors Congress intended to protect, courts applied the and effects tests.13The effects test states that the United States has jurisdiction over claims arising out of fraudulent extraterritorial conduct that caused losses within the United States or harmed U.S. markets.14 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook first articulated this test in 1968.15 The case involved the of treasury shares of a Canadian corporation, BanffOil, Ltd., at a market price Banffand its directors knew would undervalue the shares.16 The plaintiffwas an American citizen and Banffcommon stock was traded on both the American Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange.17 Although the fraudulent transaction occurred in Canada, the court found that since Banffwas listed on a U. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.009 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.028 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".