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Record W1769969722 · doi:10.2307/25148748

Information Technology and Pricing Decisions: Price Adjustments in Online Computer Markets1

2006· article· en· W1769969722 on OpenAlexaff
Oh, Lucas

Bibliographic record

VenueMIS Quarterly · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInformation technologyBusinessEconomicsMarketingIndustrial organizationMicroeconomicsFinancial economicsComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Determining prices is a key management task for a merchant. IT-enabled electronic markets facilitate price discovery by both buyers and sellers compared to traditional, physical markets. Recent research on electronic markets has revealed that IT has increased market transparency due to increased accessibility and availability of market information. However, what online sellers do in terms of strategic pricing decisions, in particular price adjustment behavior over time, has not been fully investigated. Due to the ease of making price changes, electronic sellers can execute a number of different pricing strategies, including setting the frequency and amount of price changes. We investigate the “opaque” side of electronic markets by exploring online sellers’ price adjustment patterns over time. More specifically, we identify four questions related to pricing decisions, which lead to hypotheses about how managers determine prices in electronic markets. The paper tests the hypotheses with data from the online computer commodity market. We found, through a simulation analysis, that this market exhibits synchronized price changes, not random changes that are frequently found in traditional markets. Interestingly, small price increases occur more frequently than decreases, while the frequency of price adjustment is significantly associated with a product’s price dispersion. A ranking analysis suggests that online sellers change their price strategies frequently, which makes it difficult for consumers to respond appropriately. The paper discusses the implications of our findings for management and for future research on market transparency and strategic pricing in electronic markets.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.728
Threshold uncertainty score0.559

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.009
GPT teacher head0.217
Teacher spread0.209 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations87
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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