Enforcing Security Policies on Programs
Bibliographic record
Abstract
In this paper, we present a formal technique for enforcing security policies on programs. Our technique takes an untrusted program and a security policy as input and produces a new safe program with respect to the considered policy. The proposed technique is based on the use of automata and a special composition operator called injection over automata. Injection consists in embedding the automaton representing the safety property into the automaton representing the untrusted program, so that we get a new automaton. This latter can merely be converted into a safe program which always satisfies the safety property. Consequently, our enforcement method is based on rewriting, since it takes an untrusted program and transforms it, so it produces another equivalent program satisfying the safety property. Finally, we prove that our technique is both sound and complete, i.e.: all the possible executions of the new generated program are possible executions of the original one and any possible execution of the original program respecting the security policy is a possible execution of the new generated one.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.032 | 0.097 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.008 | 0.013 |
| Open science | 0.004 | 0.008 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".