Bibliographic record
Abstract
Whenever we refer to ourselves by means of token-reflexive pronouns, ‘I’ in case of English, the problem is that we tend to assume it yields the same referent both for the narrator and the narratee. But the fact is that the subject is a subject to, and of, others; in fact, it is often an ‘Other’ to others, which also affects its sense of its own subjectivity. Second, the subject is also a subject of knowledge, most familiarly perhaps of the discourse of social institutions that circumscribe its terms of being. Third, the subject is a body that is separate (except for those pregnant) from other (non-)human bodies; and the body, and therefore the subject, is closely dependent upon its physical/cultural environment. The problem with consciousness is that it, unlike all other states, viz. the physical, chemical, biological etc., can be known from the inside as well as from the outside, which is to say some knowledge about ‘I’ is amenable to myself only, while some others to others.This paper examines the ‘gap’ in the dichotomy between the Self been thought of as Heideggerian Dasein – the resolute way of emerging from the anonymity of the mass of ‘they’ – and, as the changing but distilled core of essentially embodied experiences. Now that we are all ‘cyborgs’ (c.f. Harraway) and ‘quasi-objects’ (c.f. Latour), is object-oriented ontologizing of the Self the answer to reducing the Self to objective, non-culturally embedded, neuro-biological generalizables based on a bundle of corporal matter(s)? The Self is not material, but understandably material-dependent. Again, the Self is not entirely subjective/experiential either, but understandably conditioned upon embodied experiences. In that case, the paper speculates the (im)plausibility of an ocular Self: the impact of the ocular on (the materiality of) the Self.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.019 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.011 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.032 | 0.008 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".