Bibliographic record
Abstract
My aim is to highlight four philosophical presuppositional issues that underlie the questions associated with God-arguments precisely as such. 1 A presuppositional issue is some matter that systematically precedes a question on which one is focusing, and one‟s stance on the presuppositional issue provides a fundamental (though often overlooked) component of one‟s stance on that focal question. Moreover, differences between stances on presuppositional issues frequently constitute a basic (though often neglected) part of disputes over stances on focal questions. Finally, philosophical presuppositional issues are especially crucial, since they regard one‟s fundamental horizon – one‟s basic categories of meaning and criteria of verification. For example, your disagreement with your friend about whether capital punishment could ever be morally good may well arise at least partly from an underlying (and perhaps unnoticed) disagreement between the two of you about just what “moral goodness” means and how its presence in a concrete situation can be confirmed or disconfirmed. The first of the philosophical presuppositional issues I have in mind is epistemological: Do I ever genuinely know anything at all? The remaining issues are metaphysical. One is general: What are the characteristics of reality precisely as such? And two are particular: Is utter badness real? Is direct divine selfdisclosure real? In the first of my paper‟s three parts, I will recount four common stances on these issues that short-circuit the enterprise of attempting to argue philosophically in favor of God before it even gets started. To maintain any of them is to maintain a philosophical presupposition that excludes in advance the potential rational success of any particular argument for God, thus leaving every such argument as at most the symbolic expression of individual or collective feelings, experiences, memories, hopes, expectations, and so forth, or perhaps as just a matter of historical interest.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.017 | 0.022 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.035 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.011 | 0.019 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.011 |
| Research integrity | 0.008 | 0.009 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".