Bibliographic record
Abstract
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 34.2pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">With the passage of the Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Act of 2003, the maximum tax rate on dividend income was lowered from 38.6% to 15%.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This eliminated the traditional tax disadvantage that dividend income had relative to capital gains income.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Theoretically, this should have led a significant number of firms to increase their dividend payments.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>In an empirical analysis of firm dividend payments after the dividend tax reduction took effect, it was found that there was a statistically significant increase in the number of firms raising their dividends.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>For example, in the third quarter of 2003, 4.6% more firms increased their dividends than did so in the third quarter in 2002.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Similarly, 4.9% more firms increased their dividend payments in the fourth quarter of 2003 than did so in the fourth quarter of 2002.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A logit regression analysis of dividend changes showed that most of the change in the number of dividend increases was caused by the dividend tax reduction and not other factors such as earnings, earnings stability, investment opportunities or firm size.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The logit regression analysis also indicated that the dividend tax reduction increased by 3.7% (4.2%) the probability that the average sample firm would increase its dividend payment in the third (fourth) quarter of 2003.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It was also found that the greater a firm's blockholder share ownership the less likely the firm was to increase its dividend payment following the dividend tax reduction.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>CEO and other officer and director share ownership were found to be unrelated to the probability that a firm would increase its dividend payment.</span></span></p>
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".