Bibliographic record
Abstract
In military academies throughout the United States, there is ongoing debate about whether or not Carl Von Clausewitz’s ideas on military strategy, now nearly 200 years old, are still valid. This is an important issue to resolve considering the fact that war colleges have been inculcating their officers with Clausewitzian notions of strategy since the Vietnam War. Officers spend a great deal of time and energy studying his works, especially his classic tome On War (1827). In the past, Clausewitzian principles were credited for helping analysts identify U.S. strategic errors in Vietnam and for providing a strong basis for a successful strategy in the Persian Gulf War. These days, however, a growing number of scholars are attributing the U.S. military’s inability to secure victory in Iraq to an antiquated Clausewitzian approach to war. These critics are calling for a radical transformation of professional military education in order to avoid making similar mistakes in future conflicts. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Clausewitzian principles in 21st Century warfare, specifically with respect to the War in Iraq. The U.S. military’s failure to secure victory in the initial combat phase of the war, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, cannot be attributed to Clausewitzian strategic principles. In fact, this paper will demonstrate that precisely the opposite was true. In key areas of strategic decision making, U.S. military planning suffered where Clausewitzian precepts were either misapplied, or disavowed altogether.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.005 | 0.017 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".