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Record W1964677855 · doi:10.1509/jmkg.73.4.125

Auctioning Keywords in Online Search

2009· article· en· W1964677855 on OpenAlexaff
Jianqing Chen, Liu De, Andrew B. Whinston

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Marketing · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionRevenueAdvertisingBusinessOnline advertisingLiberian dollarValuation (finance)Profit (economics)AsideMarket shareMicroeconomicsComputer scienceMarketingThe InternetEconomicsWorld Wide Web

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Keyword advertising, or “sponsored links” that appear alongside online search results or other online content, has grown into a multibillion-dollar market. Providers of keyword advertising, such as Google and Yahoo, profit by auctioning keywords to advertisers. An issue of increasing importance for advertising providers is the “share structure” problem—that is, of the total available resources for each keyword (in terms of exposure), how large a share should be set aside for the highest bidder, for the second-highest bidder, and so on. The authors study this problem under a general specification and characterize the optimal share structures that maximize advertising providers’ revenues. They also derive results on how the optimal share structure should change with advertisers’ price elasticity of demand for exposure, their valuation distribution, total resources, and minimum bids. The authors draw implications for keyword auctions and other applications.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.017
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.024

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.017
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0050.010
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0020.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.024
GPT teacher head0.273
Teacher spread0.250 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations117
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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