MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort

Market‐Based Policy Instruments, Irrigation Water Demand, and Crop Diversification in the Bow River Basin of Southern Alberta

2009· article· en· W1966577421 on OpenAlexafffundvenueabout
Lixia He, Theodore M. Horbulyk

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d agroeconomie · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicWater resources management and optimization
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
FundersCanadian Water NetworkDepartment of Water Resources
KeywordsWater tradingScarcityIrrigationAgricultural diversificationIrrigation districtDiversification (marketing strategy)Water useWater resource managementNatural resource economicsDrainage basinEconomicsWater conservationEnvironmental scienceBusinessGeographyMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper investigates two market‐based policy instruments, short‐term water trading and volumetric water pricing, in a jurisdiction where historical water allocations are based on the seniority of appropriative water rights. The analysis identifies the potential effects of alternative surface water allocations on crop choices and on producer incomes in three irrigation districts in the Bow River Sub‐basin of the South Saskatchewan River. The short‐run effects of these alternative policy instruments are examined in scenarios where seasonal water supplies are reduced by 10–30% relative to the 2003 water usage levels. An important contribution of the paper is to present a computational, positive mathematical programming model that integrates both irrigation decisions and specific crop choices when characterizing agents' optimal responses to moderate water scarcity. The numerical results illustrate the manner in which the use of these market‐based economic instruments can increase the irrigated land area and economic welfare relative to the allocations made based only on the seniority of water rights. Under full information with no transactions costs, the use of water pricing for allocation purposes can achieve the same production outcomes as could be reached under short‐term water trading. However, the distribution of potential monetary gains and losses among agents would vary considerably across policies. Le présent article étudie deux instruments de politique fondés sur le marché, soit le commerce de l'eau à court terme et l'établissement du prix de l'eau en fonction du volume, dans une province où l'attribution de l'eau est historiquement fondée sur l'ancienneté des droits d'appropriation de l'eau. L'analyse a exposé les effets potentiels de divers moyens d'attribution de l'eau de surface sur le choix des cultures et le revenu des producteurs dans trois districts d'irrigation situés dans le sous‐bassin de la rivière Bow qui s'écoule dans le sous‐bassin de la rivière Saskatchewan Sud. Nous avons examiné les effets à court terme de ces moyens dans des scénarios où les approvisionnements saisonniers en eau ont été réduits de 10 à 30 p. 100 par rapport aux niveaux d'utilisation de l'eau établis en 2003. Le présent article visait, entre autres, à présenter un modèle de programmation mathématique positive intégrant à la fois les décisions concernant l'irrigation et le choix de cultures spécifiques au moment de caractériser les réactions optimales des agents face à une rareté modérée de l'eau. Les résultats numériques ont montré de quelle façon l'utilisation de ces instruments économiques fondés sur le marché pouvait accroître les superficies irriguées et le bien‐être économique comparativement à l'attribution de l'eau fondée sur l'ancienneté des droits d'appropriation de l'eau. Selon les renseignements complets sans coûts de transaction, le recours à l'établissement du prix de l'eau en fonction du volume et le commerce de l'eau à court terme peuvent permettre d'obtenir les mêmes résultats en matière de production. Toutefois, la répartition des pertes et des gains éventuels entre les agents varieraient considérablement d'une politique à l'autre.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.873
Threshold uncertainty score0.976

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.008
GPT teacher head0.139
Teacher spread0.131 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations19
Published2009
Admission routes4
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueCanadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d agroeconomieSame topicWater resources management and optimizationFrench-language works237,207