Controlling Shareholder and Executive Incentive Structure: Canadian Evidence
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract The presence of a controlling shareholder is a prominent feature of corporate governance. This study investigates the role of the controlling shareholder in the use of market‐based incentives in executive pay. It is proposed that a closely held firm, where an individual or an entity controls a large block of voting rights, places less weight on market‐based incentives in executive pay compared to a firm with widely dispersed shareholders. This empirical study, using Canadian firms for the 1993‐1997 period, provides support for this proposition. In addition, we find that firms controlled by founders and heirs as well as firms controlled by foreign entities display the least propensity to extend market‐based incentives to the firm's executives. Résumé Un attribut remarquable dans la gestion d'une entre‐prise est la présence d'un actionnaire dominant. Cette étude examine le rôle de l'actionnaire dominant dans la manière d'utiliser des primes basées sur le marché pour la rémunération de l'exécutif. Nous proposons que, com‐parée à une société où les actionnaires sont largement dispersés, une société étroitement gérée, où un actionnaire individuel ou une entité contrǒle un grand bloc de droit de vote, donne moins de poids aux primes basées sur le marché pour la rémunération de l'exécutif Cette étude empirique, réalisée auprès de sociétés cana‐diennes pour la période 1993‐1997, fournit l'appui pour cette proposition. En outre, nous constatons que les sociétés contǒlées par des fondateurs et des héritiers aussi bien que les sociétés contrǒlées par des entités étrangères démontrent la moindre disposition à offrir des primes basées sur le marché aux cadres de l'entre‐prise.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.015 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".