Did Bill C-24 Affect Voter Turnout? Evidence from the 2000 and 2004 Elections
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract. By tying subsidies to vote totals, Bill C-24 substantially changed the way Canadian national parties are financed. This raises the possibility of increased voter turnout, as parties face greater incentives to maximize vote totals, and voters face greater incentives to turn out. We consider this possibility. We show that turnout was not differently affected by closeness in 2004 than in 2000; that candidates' efforts were not greater in 2004 in more marginal ridings; that there were no differences in the likelihood of abstaining or deserting a preferred third-place party in 2004 and 2000; and that at the individual level, the decision to turn out was not affected by strategic considerations in the expected direction. Accordingly, we find little support for the possibility that C-24 increased turnout. Résumé. En liant les subventions au total des votes obtenus, la loi C-24 modifie substantiellement le financement des partis politiques nationaux au Canada. Ce changement pourrait induire une augmentation de la participation électorale puisque les partis ont intérêt à maximiser le nombre de votes et les électeurs sont davantage incités à voter. Nous examinons cette hypothèse. Nous démontrons que l'influence de l'intensité de la lutte entre les candidates sur la participation électorale n'a pas été différente en 2004 qu'en 2000; que les efforts des candidats n'ont pas été plus intenses en 2004 dans les circonscriptions perdues à l'avance; que la probabilité de s'abstenir ou de renoncer à appuyer un tiers parti n'a pas changé entre 2000 et 2004; et que la décision individuelle de participer à l'élection n'a pas été influencée par des considérations stratégiques allant dans la direction prévue. En conséquence, nous trouvons peu de preuves confirmant l'hypothèse selon laquelle la loi C-24 a favorisé la participation électorale.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".