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Record W1980587778 · doi:10.1093/heapol/15.4.368

Do they work? Regulating for-profit providers in Zimbabwe

2000· article· en· W1980587778 on OpenAlex
Charles Hongoro

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueHealth Policy and Planning · 2000
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersLondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
KeywordsPrivate sectorBusinessPublic economicsGovernment (linguistics)Health careLegislationStakeholderPrivate sector involvementPaymentPublic relationsEconomic growthFinanceEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The experience of low- and middle-income countries (LMC) with respect to regulation and legislation in the health sector is in marked contrast to that of Canada and Europe. It is suggested that the degree to which regulatory mechanisms can influence private sector activity in LMC is quite low. However, there has been little work done on exploring just how, and to what extent, these regulations fail. Through the use of stakeholder interviews, this study explored the effectiveness of regulations directed at the private-for-profit sector (general practitioners, private clinics and hospitals) in Zimbabwe. The study found that there was limited and asymmetric knowledge of basic regulations among government bodies and private providers. However, there was a clear feeling that regulations are not being implemented and enforced effectively. A variety of opportunistic practices have been observed among private providers, including: practices of self-referral, where patients are sent to other services the provider has a financial interest in; over-servicing; doctor-patient collusion to collect health insurance payments; and the use of unlicensed staff in private facilities. Key factors limiting effectiveness of regulation in the health sector include the over-centralization and lack of independence of the regulatory body, the absence of legal mechanisms to control the price of care, and the lack of knowledge by patients of their rights. The study also identified a number of potential strategies for improving the current regulatory environment. For example, in order to improve monitoring, 'informal' arrangements between the centralized regulatory body and local authorities developed. There is a need to develop ways to formalize the role of these authorities. In addition, professional associations of private providers are also identified as key players through which to improve the impact of regulation among private providers. Increasing consumer access to information and knowledge is another potential way to improve information within the regulatory process as well as implementation.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.636
Threshold uncertainty score0.985

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.122
GPT teacher head0.361
Teacher spread0.239 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it