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Record W2001014153 · doi:10.1103/physreve.80.051104

Social tolerance allows cooperation to prevail in an adaptive environment

2009· article· en· W2001014153 on OpenAlexaff
Xiaojie Chen, Feng Fu, Long Wang

Bibliographic record

VenuePhysical Review E · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
FundersNational Science Foundation
KeywordsRobustness (evolution)Computer scienceSocial dilemmaPrisoner's dilemmaImitationDilemmaMicroeconomicsGame theoryEconomicsSocial psychologyPsychologyMathematicsBiology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In real situations, individuals often have moderate tolerance toward ambient cooperative environment in which they tend to avoid unfavorable interactions and search for favorable ones. How such social tolerance affects the evolution of cooperation and the resulting cooperative networks remains to be answered. To address this issue, here we present an effective model of co-evolutionary prisoner's dilemma by introducing cooperative environment and social tolerance for networked players. An individual's level of cooperative environment characterizes the cooperativity and sustainability of its interaction environment centered on itself. In our model, for paired individuals we assume that the one in better cooperative environment has a certain tolerance threshold to the opponent. If the opponent's cooperative environment level is beyond the tolerance threshold, the one in better cooperative environment cuts unilaterally the link, and rewires to others. Otherwise, the link is not severed, and meanwhile an inhomogeneous strategy imitation process between them is considered. Moreover, a player's cooperative environment is adjusted in response to the strategy choices in the neighborhood. Interestingly, we find that there exists a moderate tolerance threshold warranting the best promotion of cooperation. We explain the nontrivial results by investigating the time ratio of strategy (network) updating during the whole process and properties in emerging networks. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of memory-dependent discounting of individuals' cooperative environment on the evolution of cooperation. We also demonstrate the robustness of our results by considering two other modified co-evolutionary rules. Our results highlight the importance of appropriate tolerance threshold for the evolution of cooperation during the entangled co-evolution of strategy and structure.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.686
Threshold uncertainty score0.302

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.034
GPT teacher head0.359
Teacher spread0.325 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations79
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venuePhysical Review ESame topicEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationFrench-language works237,207