Bibliographic record
Abstract
The finance literature extensively documents the abnormal positive returns of unseasoned initial public offerings (IPOs) in the early trading. Neuberger and LaChapelle (1983), McDonald and Fisher (1972), Neuberger and Hammond (1974), Reilly (1977), Logue (1973), Ibbotson (1975), Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984), Miller and Reilly (1987), and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) are but a few studies providing convincing evidence of initial price volatility in IPOs which, after some period of time, tends to level off. Some IPO studies, particularly Neuberger and LaChapelle (1983), Logue (1973), and Friend (1967), intentionally ignore institutional IPOs. Logue (1973) states that banking issues create a downward pricing bias because the market has already accurately priced the assets of financial institutions. Alli, Yau and Yung (1994) provided evidence that banking IPOs enjoyed significantly less positive abnormal returns in the early trading than a control sample of industrial firms. This study examines the early stock price movements of the 32 non‐US banking equities issued on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from January 1986 through May 2001 and finds that virtually no underpricing exists in the early trading for those issues – a vast deviation from the results of most IPO and ADR event studies, but a strong indication that banking IPOs do create a downward pricing bias when considered in IPO studies with securities from different industries. All new foreign equity issues in this study are traded as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) except the Canadian stocks.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".