Corporate governance and information asymmetry between managers and investors
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of governance on information asymmetry between managers and investors. Hence, the paper seeks to extend prior voluntary disclosure research. Design/methodology/approach The paper investigates how a firm's governance maps into the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors. Governance encompasses two complementary dimensions: formal monitoring attributes and voluntary disclosure about board processes. Information asymmetry is measured by either share price volatility or Tobin's Q. Findings The results show that some formal monitoring attributes (board and audit committee size) as well as the extent of voluntary governance disclosure reduce information asymmetry. This suggests that governance disclosure may complement a firm's governance monitoring attributes, especially in a country such as Canada where investors have good legal protection. It appears also that firms take into account ultimate costs and benefits to shareholders when determining their governance disclosure. Originality/value To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the impact of voluntary governance disclosure on information asymmetry.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.008 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it