Bibliographic record
Abstract
This essay develops James Lenman's view that ''moral inquiry is politics.''1 Unlike empirical investigation, moral inquiry is not connected with a domain of facts that exist independently of the inquiry and help explain its success.It is outward looking -your thought that slavery is wrong is not a thought about you -but confident moral beliefs are not best understood as receptivity to moral aspects of the world.Rather, they come from successfully negotiating, constructing and sustaining the rules of a moral community.Lenman's picture entails an expressivist approach to moral philosophy in contrast to moral realism, but it also exhibits cognitively ample forms of approval and disapproval that expressivists have not very fully explored.In order to frame the cognitive richness of practical deliberation, the first part of this discussion sets out important metaethical parameters.In particular it surveys differences between semantic and epistemic conceptions of truth in connection with determining and justifying reasons for belief.They suggest a case for saying that when philosophers speak of normative truth they can only demonstrate reasonableness.The second part of the discussion supports this case by displaying the advantages of focussing upon reasonableness.It supports locating a cognitivist expressivism between the extremes of normative realism and non-cognitivism where the weaknesses of standard expressivism can be avoided.The benefits include better understanding and potentially addressing many of the ethical and political issues that arise in morally engaged societies.Practical inquiry is inherently subject to disputes that go unsettled, making it dubious that ''We may, and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct.''2 By preferring to make
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.042 | 0.053 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.042 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.009 | 0.021 |
| Open science | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.012 | 0.018 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".