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Record W2039163463 · doi:10.1145/2346536.2346559

Concession patterns in multi-issue negotiations and reverse auctions

2012· article· en· W2039163463 on OpenAlexafffund
Gregory E. Kersten, Dmitry Gimon, Rustam Vahidov

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsNegotiationCommon value auctionBiddingReverse auctionWork (physics)Forward auctionComputer scienceBusinessMicroeconomicsEauctionIndustrial organizationAuction theoryEconomicsMarketingEngineeringPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Concession-making plays an important tactical role in interactions among business partners. In multi-issue negotiations a concession refers to the amount of utility a party decides to give up by making next offer. In multi-attribute auctions concession is reflected in the next bid by a bidding party that abides by the rules of a given auction mechanism. The purpose of this work is to share insights into concession-making behavior in multi-bilateral multi-issue negotiations vs. multi-attribute reverse auctions. To this end experiments have been conducted featuring auction and negotiation mechanisms. One finding indicates that participants in auctions tend to make larger concessions than those involved in negotiations. Another finding shows that the negotiators' effort to make a concession may not be perceived by their counterparts

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.399
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.195
GPT teacher head0.456
Teacher spread0.260 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2012
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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