Angel Agents: Agency Theory Reconsidered.
Why is this work in the frame?
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Full frame distilled prediction
Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
- Candidate categories
- Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
- Consensus categories
- none
- Domain
- Candidate signal: noneConsensus signal: none
- Study design
- Candidate signal: Theoretical or conceptualConsensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
- Genre
- Candidate signal: EmpiricalConsensus signal: none
- Teacher disagreement score
- 0.906
- Threshold uncertainty score
- 0.993
- Validation status
machine_predicted_unvalidated·codex-gemma-dda1882f352a
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
- Teacher spread
- 0.212 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
- Validation status
score_only:v0-immature-baseline· verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it
Abstract
Executive Overview Agency theory stipulates that executives will use their superior information to exploit owners unless effectively monitored or incentivized to do otherwise: Agents here are held to be opportunists and owners responsible parties. However, sometimes agency theory misses the mark and the reverse holds true. It may be the owners who exploit their firm and compromise its long-term interests, and steward-like agents who use their superior information to benefit a firm and its stakeholders. This analysis provides an inspiring historical example of how that can happen and illustrates some conditions under which one might expect similarly happy circumstances to arise.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
The record
- Venue
- Academy of Management Perspectives
- Topic
- Securities Regulation and Market Practices
- Field
- Business, Management and Accounting
- Canadian institutions
- HEC Montréal
- Funders
- not available
- Keywords
- Agency (philosophy)Principal–agent problemOrganizational behaviorBusinessManagementEconomicsProcess managementEpistemologyPhilosophyCorporate governance
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes