Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract There has been little, if any, analysis of the possibility of fostering certain non‐proliferation norms within the western high technology industrial sector, particularly regarding some of the newer dual use technologies. These technologies, which can assist in weapons development in recipient countries, exacerbate the difficulties of technology export controls when national security interests are balanced against the impetus for freer trade and investment. The author examines the likelihood of controlling, via a transparency norm, the transfer of intangible technologies and the intangible transfer of dual use technologies. After identifying technology transfer channels, this paper evaluates domestic and international policy instruments to address these transfers. La possibilité qu'il y aurait de promouvoir certaines normes de non‐prolifération au sein du secteur industriel de la haute technologie du monde occidental, en particulier dans le cas des nouvelles technologies à double usage, n'a jusqu'ici guère, voire pas du tout, retenu l'attention des analystes. Ces technologies, qui peuvent aider les pays destinataires à se doter de nouveaux armements, rendent d'autant plus difficiles les mesure de contrôle des exportations de procédés technologiques face à l'adéquation entre les impératifs de la sécurité nationale et le mouvement de libéralisation des échanges commerciaux et des investissements. L'auteur s'interroge sur l'éventualité qu'on puisse, grâce à une norme transparente, arriver à contrôler les transferts de technologies intangibles et les transferts intangibles de technologies à double usage. Après avoir identifié les conduits qui permettent ces transferts de technologie, il évalue l'efficacité des instruments de politique nationaux et internationaux qui pourraient être utilisés pour contrôler ceux‐ci. Notes Allen Chong is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Acadia University. An earlier version of this paper was prepared while holding the 1998–1999 NACD Post Doctoral Fellowship at York University's Centre for International and Security Studies. The author would like to thank the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for its support, along with Steve Mataija and Peter Gizewski for their helpful comments.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".