Religiosity in Canada and the United States: Diverging Paths

Abstract Comparing degrees of religiosity, Canada and the US have been moving along divergent trajectories for the past several decades. Regional variations are evident in both societies, but, taken as a whole, the divergence holds up even when these intrasocietal differences are accounted for. Neither the classic secularization thesis nor the more popular religious economy model in the sociology of religion adequately explain the contemporary disparities in religious practice and belief in the two societies. More compelling explanations lie in human security and welfare state models. Canadian and US demographic patterns, particularly internal differences among recent immigrants, are additional explanatory factors. Levels of existential security and immigration trends in the two societies are likely to sustain the divergence in religiosity. Keywords: religiositysecularizationimmigrationCanadaUS Notes 1. Lipset's work was a striking exception. 2. Some have interpreted the 40 percent figure as inflated, the product of over-reporting of a socially desirable activity (Chaves and Stephens, Citation2003). Even allowing for a somewhat lower percentage, however, Americans' church attendance remains markedly higher than that of almost all other Western societies. 3. The strength of evangelical Protestantism and political conservatism in Alberta obscures the fact that on some key measures of religiosity Alberta is actually well below the Canadian average. Only in BC do more people claim no religious affiliation (Statistics Canada, 2001), and a smaller percentage attend church than in any province except BC and Quebec (Clark, Citation2000). 4. Marci McDonald (Citation2011) argues that Christian nationalism has covertly taken a firm hold on the Harper government and is beginning to influence public policies and the makeup of the Cabinet. Should this trend become more transparent, it would not refute the current level of religiosity in Canada. Even in the US, the high political profile of religiously-based groups and organizations in recent decades has not produced a societal shift in most measures of religiosity. 5. It is true nonetheless that the church–state relationship in Canada has historically been stronger, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, and the society less religiously differentiated than the US (Beyer, Citation1997; Noll, 1992). 6. Norris and Inglehart (Citation2011) posit that, in addition to existential security, the predominant religious beliefs, values, and practices in any society are rooted in long-standing cultural traditions and histories. This religious culture serves as an adjunct to economic factors shaping the strength of religiosity. Noll (1992) suggests that because the US has historically been more religiously diffuse than Canada, it has been able to absorb secularizing changes with fewer changes in patterns of church attendance. Lipset (Citation1996) also points to the historically decentralized nature of US religion as contributing to the ability of churches to adapt to change. Moreover, divided religious loyalties—Protestant and Catholic—remained a fundamental aspect of Canadian society. This led to a very muted idea of the nation's covenant with God, in sharp contrast to the US, where the notion of "chosen people" became a customary proclamation, central to American civil religion. As Bellah (Citation1967, 7) describes it, "[God] is actively interested and involved in history, with a special concern for America." 7. Although the US, compared to other Western societies, has been a welfare state laggard in providing poor relief and social insurance, it has been a consistent leader in providing mass education. Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding (Citation2010) suggest that the dominance of Protestantism is in some part an explanation. 8. This model, in effect, links the three most evident remaining characteristics of the American exceptionalist idea, as were suggested earlier. 9. Also, the Asian American population contains a large and growing segment of those who declare no religious identity or connection (Kosmin and Keysar, Citation2009; Pew Forum, 2012), and it is reasonable to assume that Asian immigrants will continue that trend. Again, it is important to consider the diverse communities of this racial-ethnic category and the range of beliefs they bring to the American scene. 10. Using data from Statistics Canada's General Social Survey and the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey, and applying a four-item religiosity index, Clark and Schellenberg (Citation2006) found a somewhat higher level of religiosity among immigrants generally compared to the Canadian-born, but found a wide range when immigrants were disaggregated. South and Southeast Asians were highest among all groups, including the Canadian-born, and East Asians and Europeans lowest. 11. In a study of immigrant children, Kasinitz et al. (Citation2009) found their sample (limited to New York City) to be less religious than other Americans.

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