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Record W2098929222 · doi:10.1257/mic.2.4.1

Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods

2008· article· en· W2098929222 on OpenAlexaff
Hanming Fang, Peter Norman

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsExcludabilityPublic goodMicroeconomicsOutcome (game theory)Mechanism designClass (philosophy)EconomicsMoral hazardZero (linguistics)Private information retrievalPrivate goodMechanism (biology)Mathematical economicsDistribution (mathematics)MathematicsComputer scienceIncentiveComputer security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods. For a class of problems with symmetric goods and binary valuations, we show that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Relative to separate provision mechanisms, the optimal bundling mechanism may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one, and decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome for the two-good case. (JEL D82, H41)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.026
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.031

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.026
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0030.006
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0030.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.079
GPT teacher head0.333
Teacher spread0.255 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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