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Record W2118417375

TESTING EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOUR AT FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTIONS WITH DISCRETE BID INCREMENTS ∗

2003· preprint· en· W2118417375 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Harry J. Paarsch, Jacques Robert

Bibliographic record

VenueÉrudit documents and data repository (Érudit Consortium, University of Montreal) · 2003
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersConsejo Superior de Investigaciones CientíficasSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of CanadaMinisterio de Educación, Cultura y DeporteUniversitat Pompeu Fabra
KeywordsBiddingCommon value auctionMathematical economicsEconomicsHumanitiesPhysicsMicroeconomicsPhilosophy
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Dans le cadre du modèle d'enchères à valeurs privées et indépendantes, nous dérivons les implications empiriques du comportement d'équilibre dans les enchères à enveloppe scellée au premier prix, lorsque les incréments sont discrets. Bien que les comportements d'équilibre diffèrent lorsque les mises prennent des valeurs discrètes plutôt que continues, ces différences disparaissent typiquement comme les incréments tendent vers zéro. En pratique, les mises dans les enchères prennent des valeurs discrètes. De plus, ceci peut simplifier les calculs nécessaires pour estimer et tester les modèles d'enchères. Notre approche s'insère dans le cadre d'un modèle d'inférence incomplet et nous permet de tester si les données sont cohérentes avec un comportement d'équilibre dans le cadre d'un modèle symétrique aussi bien qu'asymétrique. Nous démontrons l'utilité de l'approche en l'appliquant à des données générées à partir d'expériences en laboratoire.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Science and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.307
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0020.005
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.052
GPT teacher head0.295
Teacher spread0.243 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2003
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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