Effect of Economic Conditions on Government Popularity: The Canadian Provincial Case
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract. This study tested if the economic voting hypothesis can explain voters' support for provincial governments. Using pooled time-series data from six provinces, a popularity function was developed and tested. Findings indicate that economic conditions have an effect on provincial government popularity. Voters attribute different responsibilities, however, to different political parties. Left-wing incumbent parties are held to be accountable for unemployment, while centrist and right-wing ruling parties are accountable for public deficits. Results also show that provincial government popularity depreciates over time and is correlated to the federal government's own popularity. Résumé. Cette étude a pour objectif de vérifier si l'hypothèse du vote économique peut expliquer la popularité des gouvernements provinciaux auprès des électeurs. Ainsi, une fonction de popularité est présentée, puis testée à l'aide de séries chronologiques provenant de six provinces canadiennes. Les résultats empiriques obtenus indiquent que la situation économique exerce une influence sur la popularité des gouvernements provinciaux. Toutefois, les électeurs attribuent différentes responsabilités à différents partis politiques. Ainsi, ils tiennent les partis de gauche responsables de la situation de l'emploi et les partis de centre et de droite responsables des déficits publics. De plus, les résultats démontrent que la popularité des gouvernements provinciaux se déprécie avec le temps et est corrélée à la popularité du gouvernement fédéral.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".