The Distributional Impact of the 2012–13 Higher Education Funding Reforms in England*
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper investigates the financial implications of the higher education funding regime to be introduced in English universities in September 2012. The analysis is based on simulated lifetime earnings profiles among graduates, linked to imputed information on parental incomes and institution and course choices. We find that, on average, total gross tuition fees will increase by over £15,000 as a result of the reforms; nevertheless, students will be significantly better off while they study due to the increased generosity of student support. The average graduate will be roughly £8,850 worse off over their lifetime, while universities will, on average, be better off as they are more than able to make up for the loss of substantial amounts of direct public funding through higher fees. The taxpayer is set to lose 33p of every £1 loaned to students (up from 25p under the current system) because of the generosity of the loan repayment terms, although the new regime is still expected to save the taxpayer around £2,500 per graduate overall. The reforms involve a substantial shift in the incidence of the cost of higher education away from the public sector and towards the private sector. In terms of the likely implications for social mobility, our work confirms that the new funding regime is actually more progressive than its predecessor: the poorest 29 per cent of graduates will be better off under the new system, while other graduates will be worse off. Moreover, the richest 15 per cent of graduates will pay back more than they borrow, while others will be subsidised. If prospective students from poorer backgrounds are aware of these facts, then, in theory, the new funding system should not dissuade them from applying to university – and thus it would increase, rather than reduce, social mobility in the long run. However, this will require a lack of debt aversion amongst students from the poorest backgrounds, and the ability for the government and universities to provide students with clear information about the likely costs of going to university.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.015 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".