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Record W2154050359 · doi:10.1109/iemc.2005.1559195

Cryptographic module validation program in Japan

2005· article· en· W2154050359 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Akihiro Yamagishi, K. Matsuura, Hironori Imai

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCryptographic Implementations and Security
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer securityComputer scienceCertified Information Systems Security ProfessionalSecurity serviceSecurity information and event managementCertificationInformation securityInformation security auditCommon CriteriaSecurity through obscurityComputer security modelInformation security management systemInformation security standardsAdversarySecurity testingSecurity convergenceInformation security managementCertified Information Security ManagerCloud computing securityNetwork security policy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The information system consists of networks con- taining many entities. Furthermore, an information system is built into a part of infrastructure, and bears an important role. There- fore, the security countermeasures of the information system have been important subjects. In an information system, an adversary attacks an entity with a low security level. Therefore, the security level of all the entities should be unified into the common level. If it is under common directions of an administrative organization, the security level of each entity can be unified easily. However, in order that separate administrator may administer each entity, it is not easy to unify a security level. For example, in a Japanese E- government system, each ministry agency performs procurement and administration of their system. Therefore, the security level of each E-government system is not always the same. When each system is administered separately and it is more- over hard to commit legal force, in order to unify a security level, you have to recognize a mutual security level. In order to recognize a security level, evaluation and certification of a security system are important. Common Criteria is well known for evaluation and certification of the security level of a system. Common Criteria is the security criteria for evaluating whether from a viewpoint of information security, the product and system relevant to an information technology are designed appropriately and the design is implemented surely. It was recognized as ISO/IEC standards in June, 1999. However, in Common Criteria, the evaluation and certification of Cryptographic Module which are used with an information system have not been applicable. Cryptographic Module is functional block which offers the cryptographic function used with information systems and its security level needs to evaluate. It is necessary to perform evaluation of Cryptographic Module individually with Common Criteria evaluation. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules which used in Government agency is already defined as FIPS 140-2 in the U.S. and Canada. And they cooperate with the Validation scheme. The system which the U.S. and Canada are operating is premised on unitary control. However, in many E-government system of Japan, the vendor of Cryptographic Module and the vendor of a system are in same company. When the vendor of Cryptographic Module and a system is in common, the specification of Cryptographic Module is not released in many cases. Therefore, much time is required in order to build a system like the U.S. and Canada. Then, we did the case study about the conditions for building up Cryptographic Module Validation system smoothly under the situation like Japan. In this paper, we report that result.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.020
Threshold uncertainty score0.066

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.001
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0200.006

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.019
GPT teacher head0.299
Teacher spread0.280 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2005
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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