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Record W2168451299

Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, Insurance Law and Double Standards

2014· article· en· W2168451299 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Anthony J. Sebok

Bibliographic record

VenueeYLS (Yale Law School) · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicLegal principles and applications
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsLawPolitical scienceLaw and economicsCommon lawEconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Litigation investment, sometimes known as litigation finance, is increasingly accepted around the world. Once prohibited as champerty, litigation investment is now embraced in England, Canada, and Australia, as well as in many civil law nations. In the United States, the development of a robust market for investment in litigation has been met by various objections. One objection is that litigation investment interferes with the autonomy of lawyers. A second objection is that it promotes frivolous litigation. This Article takes up a popular argument against litigation investment: the legal system should not encourage parties to sell their control over litigation that would vindicate their rights. This criticism is based on an unspoken assumption that private law theory requires party control to stay with the original rightholder and contracts that allow the sale of party control to a stranger should be struck down, either for being contrary to public policy or for some other legal basis. Although I briefly consider justifications rooted in moral philosophy, which support the view that party control should not be sold, I focus mostly on arguments based on the common law. I propose that arguments against the sale of party control based on the structure or nature of the common law are anachronistic. As society evolved, courts and legal commentators abandoned such arguments, which once constrained the sale of party control before the middle of the nineteenth century. Liberal attitudes about the sale of party control were first seen in the gradual elimination of rules limiting the assignment of choses in action. Liberalization was next seen in insurance. I will demonstrate that as the role of insurance in society grew, courts reinterpreted common law practices to permit the alienation of control of litigation for profit in various contexts, including subrogation and liability insurance. This Article concludes that by looking at the evolution of insurance law, we can learn how rigid attitudes about the relationship between victims and wrongdoers can be bent to fit social needs. The Article takes note of the growing consensus in the United States, as well as in other common law nations, regarding the social benefits of litigation investment. Finally, I argue that given the appetite for litigation investment among the public, courts and policymakers should be skeptical of arguments that use party control as a justification to block this new form of financing for lawsuits.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.928
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.307
Teacher spread0.277 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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