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Evaluating an Environmental Right: Information Disclosure, Public Comment, and Government Decision Making in Ontario

2008· article· en· W2169134211 on OpenAlex
Brady J. Deaton, Anastasia M. Lintner, Donna Ramirez Harrington

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d agroeconomie · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicRegulation and Compliance Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
Fundersnot available
KeywordsGovernment (linguistics)Argument (complex analysis)IncentiveWelfare economicsPolitical sciencePublic administrationHumanitiesLaw and economicsSociologyEconomicsPhilosophyMicroeconomicsMedicine

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In 1993, the Ontario government enacted the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR). The EBR guarantees residents of the province, among other things, the right to comment on permit requests to take water and to discharge into the air and a guarantee that these comments are taken into account in the decision to approve or deny a permit. We model the firm's decision to request a permit, a resident's decision to provide public comment, and the government's decision to approve or deny permit requests to use water or air. Our examination of 1,000 government decisions regarding permit requests leads to two key findings: (1) few permit requests receive any public comment; and (2) to the extent that the public does comment, we find no empirical evidence that comments affect the likelihood that the government will deny a permit request. Our theoretical model anticipates the first result: there are few comments observed for permit applications, because each individual has an incentive to undercontribute to the provision of a public good. The second result did not support the theoretical argument we advance: government, acting to maximize social welfare, takes public concern as a signal of environmental damage. En 1993, le gouvernement de l'Ontario a édicté la Charte des droits environnementaux (CDE). La CDE garantit aux résidents de la province, entre autres, le droit de faire des observations sur les demandes de permis pour puiser l'eau et rejeter des quantités limitées de substances polluantes dans l'air, et garantit aussi que ces observations seront prises en considération dans la décision d'accorder ou de refuser un permis. Nous avons modélisé la décision d'une entreprise de déposer une demande de permis, la décision d'un résident de faire des observations et la décision du gouvernement d'accorder ou de refuser les demandes de permis pour l'usage de l'eau ou de l'air. L'examen de 1000 décisions du gouvernement concernant des demandes de permis a menéà deux principaux constats: 1. peu de demandes de permis reçoivent des observations du public; 2. lorsque le public soumet des observations, aucune évidence empirique ne laisse supposer que les observations influent sur la probabilité que le gouvernement rejette une demande de permis. Notre modèle théorique a anticipé le premier constat: les demandes de permis reçoivent peu d'observations parce que chaque individu a un incitatif à sous–contribuer à la fourniture d'un bien collectif. Le deuxième constat n'a pas appuyé notre argument théorique voulant que le gouvernement, qui agit afin de maximiser le bien–être collectif, tienne compte des préoccupations du public comme un signal de dommage environnemental .

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.890
Threshold uncertainty score0.909

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.004
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.048
GPT teacher head0.189
Teacher spread0.141 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it