Bibliographic record
Abstract
At the end of World War II the United States embarked on an ambitious agenda of dam construction to stimulate the economy of the Pacific Northwest. A complete hydroelectric system was planned, including upstream storage dams that would moderate the river's seasonal flow fluctuations and downstream run of river dams that would produce electricity with the modified flow. Assigned to the politically powerful Army Corps of Engineers, the downstream dams proceeded on schedule, while the upstream dams stalled under the direction of the weaker Interior Department. The United States was left in an untenable situation where the downstream dams would sit losing money for most of the year, unable to produce sufficient electricity to repay their cost of construction with the river's unmoderated flow. Political opposition and environmental pressures ultimately coalesced to halt the construction of the upstream dams in the United States, and made Canada the most feasible location for adding upstream storage. This plan ultimately became the 1964 Columbia River Treaty. To fishery advocates, the Treaty was an attractive plan because previous dam construction had made salmon runs extinct on the Canadian Columbia, whereas salmon still ran on the American tributaries where upstream storage had been previously proposed. As such, this study finds that contrary to what has previously been understood about the Columbia River Treaty, the United States pursued the agreement in part out of environmental motives. The construction of three dams in British Columbia under the Treaty ultimately had significant negative ecological consequences for valleys flooded out by reservoirs, and the elimination of seasonal floods was detrimental to salmon runs downstream in the United States.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.018 | 0.018 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.018 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.012 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".