Bibliographic record
Abstract
The establishment of the Berlin Wall was one of the seminal moments of the Cold War. Not only did the wall serve as the most powerful symbol of the protracted conflict, but its erection was one of the few occasions in which a hot war appeared imminent. Construction on the Berliner Mauer began on 13 August 1 961, marking the beginning of the indefinite period that has become known as the Berlin Wall crisis. Although Berlin was technically under the purview of the occupation powers, the other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries had a vested interest in the status of Berlin because of the strategic and symbolic significance of the divided city. Canada was no exception, as was demonstrated by the active and leading role the country played within the western alliance during the crisis, displaying a commitment to Cold War collective security.The Progressive Conservative government of John G. Diefenbaker set forth its policy in two major public addresses-a speech on ? September to the Canadian Bar Association and in the opening statement to the fall session of the house of commons on 7 September. It will be argued here that the Canadian government arrived at a firm, balanced, and constructive response to the crisis: a commitment to allied rights in Berlin and the resolve to use force to defend them if necessary-including an increase in Canada's military capabilities-while exhibiting a willingness to negotiate and involve the United Nations. Although this approach represented a blending of Diefenbaker's and the Department of External Affairs' views-with the input of Escott Reid, Canadian ambassador to West Germany-the final shape and tone of the policy was ultimately determined by Diefenbaker.This article will take the form of an in tra- govern mental deci s ion- making history, charting the evolution of Canadian policy from 13 August to 7 September 1 9 61. This requires examining the discussions within and between Diefenbaker's cabinet and the Department of External Affairs (DEA). The latter sought to chart a course emphasizing negotiations-what could be termed a more conciliatory response-while Diefenbaker favoured a response that underlined negotiations with an ability to respond militarily.The relevant sources are therefore the files of the Department of External Affairs, cabinet conclusions, and the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers. Unfortunately, the Diefenbaker prime ministerial papers (including the personal and confidential series) reveal virtually nothing about Diefenbaker's rationale or discussions within the prime minister's office and the Progressive Conservative government. The cabinet conclusions, however, do provide some insight into the thought processes of the government, while the External Affairs papers reveal a great deal about that department's opinions.Diefenbaker's memoirs have little to say about the Berlin crisis, which is surprising given that it appears to be one of the highlights of his foreign policy record. The majority of secondary sources covering Canadian international activities in 19 61 either briefly mention the Berlin Wall crisis, or omit it entirely. Basil Robinson served as the liaison between the PMO and External Affairs, and his study of Diefenbaker's foreign policy, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs, is the most revealing secondary source concerning the 1961 crisis. Itis virtually the only source that delves into the evolution of the Canadian position to any extent. Peyton V Lyon's Canada in World Affairs, 19 61-19 63 ^s also useful, occupying a unique position as a qua si- primary source, since it was published in 1968, and the author interviewed a number of individuals involved. Both Lyon and Robinson identify the government's response as a positive one, and this study shares their assessment of the final policy. However, Lyon's contribution does not adequately explore the intra-governmental policy formulation process that took place in August, while Robinson's evaluation does not sufficiently credit Diefenbaker's role. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".